Stand up to Russia
Sending troops to help Georgia is out of the question, but the U.S.must do more than issue strongly worded statements.
By Max Boot
The Los Angeles Times August 12, 2008
It took the Red Army -- excuse me, the Russian army -- only two daysto secure Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Now Russia is pressing itsattacks into the heart of Georgia, threatening to cut the majoreast-west highway and vital oil pipeline. Moscow's ultimate goalremains unclear, but it may well be to topple the democraticallyelected government of President Mikheil Saakashvili and replace himwith a pro-Kremlin stooge. That is what the Russians did in Chechnyain 1999-2000.
The difference is that, while Chechnya had aspirations of nationhood,Georgia has already achieved it. Since the collapse of the Sovietempire in 1991, it has been a fully sovereign country. More recently,as a result of the 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia has become ademocracy -- admittedly an imperfect democracy, but with far greaterrule of law than Russia. By crossing Georgia's borders, the Russianshave committed their worst violation of international law since theinvasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
At a time like this, it is vital for the leaders of the West to standtogether and make clear that this aggression will not stand. This isno time for weaselly statements of moral equivalence claiming thatGeorgia brought this war on itself or that Russia's response is merely"disproportionate" -- as if there were a "proportionate" level ofaggression that would be justified. Whatever the details of the clashthat began last week between Georgia and the breakaway, pro-Russiaprovince of South Ossetia, there can be no excuse for Russia'sinvasion. The presidents of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland wereon the mark in their demand that "aggression against a small countryin Europe ... not be passed over in silence or with meaninglessstatements equating the victims with the victimizers.
"The more hysterical excuses that Moscow makes for its aggression areparticularly creepy. Pravda accuses Saakashvili of committing "warcrimes against humanity" and claims that Russia had no choice but toprotect its citizens in South Ossetia from a "savage, brutal, criminalattack" by "the back-stabbing Georgians." There are echoes here ofGerman spokesmen from the 1930s shedding crocodile tears over thesupposed mistreatment of German minorities in nearby states. Thosewere the excuses that Hitler used to swallow Czechoslovakia and Poland.
The Nazi analogy may appear overwrought. Certainly no one is claimingthat Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is another Hitler, auniquely evil and reckless madman. But Putin does appear to have morethan a passing resemblance to lesser autocrats such as Mussolini andthe Japanese generals of the 1930s whose aggression nevertheless hadtragic repercussions. Indeed, two other historical analogies that cometo mind are the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the Italianinvasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Both set the stage for World War II byrevealing the impotence of the League of Nations and the unwillingnessof the great powers to respond forcefully to aggression.Likewise, the Russian attacks on Georgia, if left unchecked, couldeasily trigger more conflict in the future. The Kremlin has embarkedon a campaign to destabilize not just pro-Western Georgia but otherformer Soviet satrapies that refuse to toe its line. Many of thesestates have their own Russian minorities whose alleged maltreatmentprovides the perfect excuse for Russian meddling. Today, Georgia;tomorrow, Ukraine; the day after, Estonia?
If there is one thing that has limited Russian action against theBaltic states to cyber-attacks, economic pressure and verbal bullying,it is that these countries are now part of NATO. NATO's refusal togive Georgia a "membership action plan" earlier this year was ablunder that emboldened Russian aggression. That is a mistake thaturgently needs to be rectified.The West must demand that Russia withdraw its troops from all of Georgia's soil, possibly to be replaced in South Ossetia and Abkhaziawith international peacekeepers. If the Kremlin won't comply, the Westshould respond with sanctions such as withdrawing ambassadors fromMoscow, kicking Russia out of the Group of 8 leading industrializednations and freezing Russian bank accounts abroadWe should also do more to help Georgia defend itself. Sending Americantroops is out of the question, but we can send American equipment.
That's what we did in 1973 when Israel appeared on the verge of losingthe Yom Kippur War, and it is a favor we should extend to ourembattled ally in the Caucasus. The greatest bang for the buck wouldcome from two inexpensive hand-held missiles: the Stinger to destroyRussian aircraft and the Javelin to destroy tanks. Pictures of longcolumns of Russian vehicles advancing slowly down winding mountainroads indicate that a few well-placed missiles could wreak havoc withtheir operations.
Many will claim that such steps are needlessly "provocative" and thatthe fate of Georgia is inconsequential beside the larger imperative ofmaintaining good relations with Russia. We have heard such talkbefore. The world failed in the 1930s to rally to the defense of smallstates such as Ethiopia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Finland when theywere menaced by larger predators. The statesman of the time calculatedthat the cost of action was too high. What we learned in retrospectwas that the cost of inaction was far higher. That is a lesson weshould heed today.
Max Boot is a contributing editor to Opinion and the Jeane J.Kirkpatrick senior fellow in national security studies at the Councilon Foreign Relations.
Sending troops to help Georgia is out of the question, but the U.S.must do more than issue strongly worded statements.
By Max Boot
The Los Angeles Times August 12, 2008
It took the Red Army -- excuse me, the Russian army -- only two daysto secure Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Now Russia is pressing itsattacks into the heart of Georgia, threatening to cut the majoreast-west highway and vital oil pipeline. Moscow's ultimate goalremains unclear, but it may well be to topple the democraticallyelected government of President Mikheil Saakashvili and replace himwith a pro-Kremlin stooge. That is what the Russians did in Chechnyain 1999-2000.
The difference is that, while Chechnya had aspirations of nationhood,Georgia has already achieved it. Since the collapse of the Sovietempire in 1991, it has been a fully sovereign country. More recently,as a result of the 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia has become ademocracy -- admittedly an imperfect democracy, but with far greaterrule of law than Russia. By crossing Georgia's borders, the Russianshave committed their worst violation of international law since theinvasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
At a time like this, it is vital for the leaders of the West to standtogether and make clear that this aggression will not stand. This isno time for weaselly statements of moral equivalence claiming thatGeorgia brought this war on itself or that Russia's response is merely"disproportionate" -- as if there were a "proportionate" level ofaggression that would be justified. Whatever the details of the clashthat began last week between Georgia and the breakaway, pro-Russiaprovince of South Ossetia, there can be no excuse for Russia'sinvasion. The presidents of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland wereon the mark in their demand that "aggression against a small countryin Europe ... not be passed over in silence or with meaninglessstatements equating the victims with the victimizers.
"The more hysterical excuses that Moscow makes for its aggression areparticularly creepy. Pravda accuses Saakashvili of committing "warcrimes against humanity" and claims that Russia had no choice but toprotect its citizens in South Ossetia from a "savage, brutal, criminalattack" by "the back-stabbing Georgians." There are echoes here ofGerman spokesmen from the 1930s shedding crocodile tears over thesupposed mistreatment of German minorities in nearby states. Thosewere the excuses that Hitler used to swallow Czechoslovakia and Poland.
The Nazi analogy may appear overwrought. Certainly no one is claimingthat Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is another Hitler, auniquely evil and reckless madman. But Putin does appear to have morethan a passing resemblance to lesser autocrats such as Mussolini andthe Japanese generals of the 1930s whose aggression nevertheless hadtragic repercussions. Indeed, two other historical analogies that cometo mind are the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the Italianinvasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Both set the stage for World War II byrevealing the impotence of the League of Nations and the unwillingnessof the great powers to respond forcefully to aggression.Likewise, the Russian attacks on Georgia, if left unchecked, couldeasily trigger more conflict in the future. The Kremlin has embarkedon a campaign to destabilize not just pro-Western Georgia but otherformer Soviet satrapies that refuse to toe its line. Many of thesestates have their own Russian minorities whose alleged maltreatmentprovides the perfect excuse for Russian meddling. Today, Georgia;tomorrow, Ukraine; the day after, Estonia?
If there is one thing that has limited Russian action against theBaltic states to cyber-attacks, economic pressure and verbal bullying,it is that these countries are now part of NATO. NATO's refusal togive Georgia a "membership action plan" earlier this year was ablunder that emboldened Russian aggression. That is a mistake thaturgently needs to be rectified.The West must demand that Russia withdraw its troops from all of Georgia's soil, possibly to be replaced in South Ossetia and Abkhaziawith international peacekeepers. If the Kremlin won't comply, the Westshould respond with sanctions such as withdrawing ambassadors fromMoscow, kicking Russia out of the Group of 8 leading industrializednations and freezing Russian bank accounts abroadWe should also do more to help Georgia defend itself. Sending Americantroops is out of the question, but we can send American equipment.
That's what we did in 1973 when Israel appeared on the verge of losingthe Yom Kippur War, and it is a favor we should extend to ourembattled ally in the Caucasus. The greatest bang for the buck wouldcome from two inexpensive hand-held missiles: the Stinger to destroyRussian aircraft and the Javelin to destroy tanks. Pictures of longcolumns of Russian vehicles advancing slowly down winding mountainroads indicate that a few well-placed missiles could wreak havoc withtheir operations.
Many will claim that such steps are needlessly "provocative" and thatthe fate of Georgia is inconsequential beside the larger imperative ofmaintaining good relations with Russia. We have heard such talkbefore. The world failed in the 1930s to rally to the defense of smallstates such as Ethiopia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Finland when theywere menaced by larger predators. The statesman of the time calculatedthat the cost of action was too high. What we learned in retrospectwas that the cost of inaction was far higher. That is a lesson weshould heed today.
Max Boot is a contributing editor to Opinion and the Jeane J.Kirkpatrick senior fellow in national security studies at the Councilon Foreign Relations.
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