Eurasia Daily Monitor
Volume 5, Number 153
UKRAINE AND THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH OSSETIA
By Roman Kupchinsky
Monday, August 11, 2008
In the morning of August 10, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairsinformed its Russian counterpart that in order to prevent Ukraine frombeing drawn into an armed conflict, Ukraine might take measures toprevent the Russian Black Sea Fleet (RBSF) vessels from returning totheir base in Sevastopol in the Crimea if they were involved in combatoperations against Georgia. This ban might last until the conflict inSouth Ossetia is “regulated,” the website of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of Ukraine stated.
Two days earlier, on August 8, the, troop landing ship Yamal leftSevastopol for the Russian port of Novorossiysk, according to a reporton the www.proUA.com website which also noted that a large contingent ofships from the RBSF that had taken part in the military exerciseCaucasus-2008 in late July did not return to Sevastopol but remained inNovorossiysk (www.proUA.com, August 10).Western media reported that on the night of August 9, Russian troops hadbeen put ashore from warships into the disputed territory of Abkhazia.
On August 9 the flagship of the RBSF, the cruiser Moskva, with thecommanding admiral of the fleet, Alexander Kletskov aboard, sailed fromSevastopol. It was accompanied by the destroyer Smetlivy and theanti-submarine ships Muromets and the Aleksandrovets, along with anassortment of support vessels.
As the situation on the ground in South Ossetia rapidly deteriorated,Georgian National Security Council Secretary Alexander Lomaia told themedia that the Russian navy was blocking Georgian ports and preventingships laden with grain and fuel from entering. Meanwhile, Interfaxreported that "The navy was ordered not to allow supplies of weapons andmilitary hardware into Georgia by sea."On August 10, however, Novosti Press Agency quoted an unnamed, highlyplaced source in the General Staff of the Russian navy as saying thatthe role of the RBSF in the conflict was to merely “provide aid torefugees” and strongly denied that Russian ships were blockading theGeorgian coast. “A blockade of the coast would mean that we were at warwith Georgia…which we are not,” the source was quoted as saying.
The question of what type of humanitarian role the cruiser Moskva, armedwith 16 cruise missiles, torpedoes and an assortment of othersophisticated weaponry, could play was not raised.Ukraine’s threat elicited a quick response from the Russian side.Anatoly Nagovitsin, the deputy head of the General Staff of the Russianarmed forces, was quoted by UNIAN press agency on August 10 as sayingthat the Ukrainian statement “needed reworking,” adding that thus farthe RBSF was not engaged in military actions against Georgian ships butthat this could possibly change along with the situation.
Later that day, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gregory Karasin told apress conference in Moscow that the Russian foreign ministry would begintalks with Ukraine on the return of the RBSF to Sevastopol, adding thatRussian ships were close to Abkhaz territorial waters in order toprevent a situation similar to the one in South Ossetia from takingplace in Abkhazia (UNIAN, August 10, 2008).Russian statements took on more ominous tones later that evening afterRussian troops began an assault on the Georgian city of Gori. TheUkrayinska Pravda website quoted a spokesman for the Russian ForeignMinistry as saying, “The actions by the Ukrainian side are contrary toUkrainian-Russian agreements and are hostile to the Russian Federation.”At approximately the same time, Interfax, citing information released bythe Russian navy, reported that a Georgian military ship had been sunkby the Russian fleet off the coast of Abkhazia.The Ukrainian move seems to have come as a nasty surprise for theKremlin and the Russian General Staff, but it is also a risky one forUkrainian President Viktor Yushchenko. Throughout Yushchenko’spresidency, Ukraine and Georgia have been exceptionally close. They bothapplied for a Membership Action Plan in order to join NATO as part oftheir pro-Western policies, and both were rejected. Ukrainian arms salesto Georgia have been bitterly criticized by Russia, which claims thatthe arms were being used by Georgia for “ethnic cleansing.”As recently as mid-July, Ukrainian, Azeri, Armenian and U.S. troops tookpart in a large scale Georgian military exercise, “Immediate Response2008,” which was planned by the U.S. Armed Forces European Command andfinanced by the U.S. Defense Department.If the Ukrainian leadership goes through with its threat to close offSevastopol to Russian ships returning from the Georgian coast, a host ofproblems might arise.The political situation on the Crimean peninsula, never favorable forKyiv, could deteriorate further and increase calls by Russianpoliticians not to renew the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, andPartnership by which Russia recognized the present borders of Ukraineand which is due to expire in December 2008.If the treaty expires, the consequences could be severe, since thistreaty, in addition to Nikita Khrushchev’s handover of the territory toUkraine in 1954, legalized Ukrainian claims to the Crimea. This couldpave the way for renewed calls by Russian politicians and militaryleaders to annex the peninsula.
Another problem that is sure to become aggravated is the continuingdispute between Kyiv and Moscow over the Russian lease of the RBSF basein Sevastopol, which is due to expire in 2017. Ukraine does not want toextend the lease, and the Russians insist that it be prolonged.But the main question worrying the West and the Ukrainian leadership isthat an emboldened nationalistic Russia might decide to come to the“rescue” of the predominantly Russian population in the Crimea just asit “came to the rescue” of the South Ossetians and Abkhaz.Such a scenario could conceivably force Kyiv to defend its territorialintegrity and declare war on Russia, which would have enormousrepercussions around the world.
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